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PREFACE
As a part of an ongoing validation research program, NASA Langley spon-
sored a sub-working-group meeting on the role of formal verification techniques
in system validation. This meeting was held at the Georgia Institute of Technol-
ogy in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 7-8, 1983. The meeting was conducted to assess
the value and the state of the art of performance proving for fault-tolerant com-
puters. Particular attention was given to the work done by SRI International
concerning the investigation, development and evaluation of performance proving
tools.
The two-day meeting began with a review of the techniques developed by
SRI to formally verify portions of the NASA LaRC sponsored Software Imple-
mented Fault Tolerant (SIFT} computer design and continued by discussing the
soundness of these techniques. Issues concerning the specification language, map-
pings between hierarchical levels, the interface between the design and code
proofs, and SRI's STP design proof environment were addressed.
Approximately 20 leading researchers and system developers were invited to
attend this review. These researchers were selected from both recognized advo-
cates of formal verification and acknowledged skeptics.
NASA LaRC's objective in sponsoring this peer review was to examine the
technical issues related to proof methodologies. The technical issues discussed are
summarized in this report.
ooo
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
Future commercial aircraft will rely heavily on computer-based flight control
systems. Failure of a computer system can be tolerated in contemporary com-
mercial aircraft because the flight crew can assume the control functions, but the
flight stability margins of future aircraft may be greatly reduced, making human
control an inadequate substitute for a computerized control system. For such air-
craft designs to be acceptable, the reliability of the flight control systems must be
comparable to that of other parts of the aircraft. A reliability criterion that
NASA has adopted is that the estimated probability of failure in the flight con-
trol system should not exceed 10-9 for a flight of 10 hours duration. This level of
reliability is higher than is possible with conventional uni-processor hardware and
software.
In order to investigate the possibility of attaining such ultra-reliability,
NASA-LaRC has sponsored research and development in fault-tolerant computer
architectures since 1972. A portion of this effort was directed toward the concep-
tion, design, and implementation of a computer system known as SIFT (Software
Implemented Fault Tolerance). Since it is not possible to demonstrate by solely
testing that a system has a failure rate as small as that proposed for a flight con-
trol system, the desired level of reliability must be established by a combination
of validation methods including some form of mathematical proof. According to
one publication describing SIFT, "The need for such a proof of reliability has
been a major influence on the design of SIFT."1
Recognizing the importance and the difficulty of a proof of correctness of a
computer system such as SIFT, NASA-LaRC awarded a contract to SRI Interna-
tional entitled "Investigation, Development and Evaluation of Performance Prov-
ing for Fault-Tolerant Computers." The work done under this contract, dealing
with performance proving, is the focus of this report. The objective of the per-
formance proving work was given in the "Statement of Work" of the contract as
follows:
"The objective of this effort is the investigation, development, and
evaluation of an experimental facility that will aid in analytically
proving the correct performance of embedded fault-tolerant comput-
ers in aircraft flight control systems. The end objective of this effort
is to provide an automated capability, residing on a host computer, to
analytically, prove that a design and implementation specification
meets the design intent (or is correct)."
1.2 The Formal Verificatlon/Deslgn Proof Peer Review
The Formal Verification/Design Proof Peer Review was conducted to assess
the value and the state-of-the-art of design verification for fault-tolerant comput-
ers, and to review the work done by SRI International concerning the investiga-
tion, development and evaluation of design verification tools. The peer review
took place in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 7 and 8, 1983. A list of the members of
the panel that conducted the review can be found at the front of this report.
The findings of the panel are the subject of this report.
1.3 Objectives of the Peer Review
The objective of the peer review was to assess the role of formal techniques
in system validation, with emphasis on the methodology developed by SRI Inter-
national. A list of issues was formulated prior to the peer review and was
reviewed by SRI International prior to the meeting. The list follows:
1. The Role of Formal Techniques in System Validation
a. To what extent does formal mathematical verification satisfy the goal of
total system validation?
b. When is formal verification more cost-effective than other validation
techniques?
c. What effect does the need for validation have on system design?
d. Is the approach applicable to large systems?
e. Can numerical programs, concurrency and other language features be
handled?
f. Does the need for verification affect the likelihood of specification
errors?
g. How is system structure constrained by the need for formal verification?
2. The SRI International Design Proof Methodology
a. What is the role of the design proof methodology in system validation?
b. Is the methodology mathematically sound?
c. Are the components of the methodology (including the specification
language, the inter-level mappings, the interface between design and
code proof, and the STP design proof environment) individually sound?
d. Does the approach lead to readable, believable specifications?
e. Does the methodology make effective use of human and machine
resources?
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f. Are the axioms which must be assumed in the verification process rea-
sonable? Can they be experimentally validated?
The sequence of questions addressed by the peer review panel (i.e., the Criti-
cal Issues of Section 3) was based on this set of issues.
1.4 Sources of Material for this Report
The material contained in this report comes from a variety of sources. At
the close of the peer review, each participant was asked to provide written com-
ments on a number of issues; additionally, SRI International representatives were
asked to provide a written position statement on the same issues. The position
statements and the collective comments of the panel were the principal source of
the material contained herein. Additional material in the report is taken from
tape recordings and the editors' notes made at the meeting.
1._ Organization of the Report
The following is a brief description of the contents of the remaining sections
of the report.
Section 2 provides background for the SIFT validation work. It also summarizes
technical results relative to the issues addressed at the peer review, including the
work on the SIFT validation effort.
Section 3 is the body of the report; it is devoted to discussion of a set of "critical
issues" discussed at the peer review.
Section _ examines the issue of claims regarding research accomplishments.
Section 5 summarizes the conclusions of this review.
Appendix A contains a summary of SRI International research relevant to this
contract. This summary is an edited version written after the conclusion of the
meeting. SRI also wrote the original summary on which this is based.
Appendix B describes the mathematical foundations of the method used in prov-
ing SIFT. This work, done by Jose Meseguer of SRI International subsequent to
the meeting, was in response to questions of the panel regarding the soundness of
the work.
Appendix C, written by SRI International personnel, describes how the material
in Appendix B applies to SIFT.
The references are given at the end of the report.
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2.0 APPROACH TO VERIFICATION RESEARCH
The SIFT performance proving effort was intended to provide a test of the
tools and techniques for the verification of functional properties of fault-tolerant
computer systems. The verification effort was coordinated with the SIFT design
and development effort. An interesting result of this coordination is that the
verification effort uncovered several flaws in the SIFT design, and these
discoveries resulted in important design changes.
The work produced a number of other interesting and substantial results
concerning the general problem of the design and validation of fault-tolerant
computers; these have been reported in the literature in papers dealing with
topics such as clock synchronization in the presence of faults, 2 and the Byzantine
Generals problem. 3
The validation of any system requires a characterization of the intended sys-
tem behavior. In the case of fault tolerant systems, this characterization can be
broken into a functional specification that describes the behavior of the system in
the absence of debilitating system failure, and an upper bound on the probability
of such failure. Given such a system specification, validation of fault tolerant
systems can be done by
(1) developing one or more modelh of the system;
(2) showing that each of the models accurately describes some chosen facet or
property of the system and its behavior, and
(3) showing that each model (and hence the system) possesses the desired
correctness, temporal or reliability properties.
Of the properties listed in (3) above, "correctness" means that the system
correctly computes the desired flight-control functions. The intended "temporal"
property is that the system performs all its tasks, including those associated with
an operating system as well as the computing of flight-control functions within
specified time constraints. The intended "reliability" property can be given as an
upper bound on the probability of a system failure that might endanger the air-
craft. The performance proving effort was only concerned with establishing
correctness; establishing reliability and temporal properties was not part of the
effort.
Neither the adequacy of a system specification nor the adequacy of a model's
description of a system can be established by any formal means; they are ulti-
mately accepted or rejected on the basis of informed judgment, which may in
turn be based on testing or analysis. But showing that a model has a specific
property or is satisfied by a more detailed model is, in many cases, a well-formed
mathematical problem.
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There are three types of models appropriate to a system such as SIFT; these
models correspond to the three kinds of properties that the system is to have:
(1) Functional models characterize the functional behavior of the physical com-
ponents of the SIFT hardware during normal operation (and possibly during
some modes of failure). The desired functional behavior of the SIFT system
was characterized by means of a set of axioms in a first-order predicate cal-
culus.
(2) Timing models ensure that tasks are performed frequently enough and fast
enough to maintain the aircraft in a safe state. These models were not part
of the current performance proving project.
(3) Markov models characterize the failure modes and probabilities of the physi-
cal components of the SIFT hardware. These provide a basis for showing
that the probability of system failure is sufficiently small. These models
were also not part of the current performance proving effort.
Proving that a system has a specified functional behavior requires verifying
that the programs have the desired properties and that the system hardware
correctly implements the programming language semantics. Although some work
has been done on characterizing SIFT hardware, this work was not discussed at
the peer review. Moreover, no attempt was made to prove the Pascal compiler
correct. Thus the work discussed at the peer review assumes the correctness of a
Pascal compiler for the variant of Pascal used for most of the coding, and it
assumes that the SIFT component machines correctly implemented the target
code.
The part of the verification problem, generic to any fault tolerant system, is
to show that the system software is functionally correct. The technical approach
was to show that the overall design of the system is correct, and verify the code
which implements it.
The difficulty of verifying SIFT results largely from the use of several pro-
cessors in the system. SIFT uses from five to eight identical processors, each
with its own clock and its own storage; communication is by a broadcast mechan-
ism. The system software assigns both flight control tasks and operating system
tasks to component processors. Fault detection and masking as well as system
reconfiguration are managed by software. To guard against failures, tasks are
replicated on three or more processors and the task output is determined by
majority vote. One task is responsible for detecting permanent failures so that a
failed processor's output will be subsequently ignored. The processors maintain a
loose synchronization by periodic comparison of the clocks of working processors.
For the functional model, a hierarchy of models was constructed. At the top
level of this hierarchy is a set of assertions intended to specify the desired global
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functional behavior of the SIFT system; these assertions are called the I/O
Specifications. The part of the validation effort described at the peer review con-
sisted principally of the design proof effort, which was to show that if the code of
SIFT satisfies the appropriate PrePost conditions, then the system implements
the top level functional system specifications (the I/O Specifications) so long as a
sufficient number of processors are working correctly.
The hierarchy of models between the I/O specifications and the Pascal code
reflects many of the design decisions made for SIFT, and proofs involving the
hierarchy are referred to as "design proofs." The design proofs are meant to show
that each level of the hierarchy (except the top-most one) logically implies the
level above it. The lowest level of the hierarchy is a model whose assertions are
essentially the code PrePost conditions.
3.0 THE CRITICAL ISSUES
Prior to the peer review, a list of critical issues was formulated and circu-
lated to all participants. A second list of issues was formulated by the panel on
the second day of the review. The list of issues in this report was obtained by
merging similar issues from these two lists and altering others to better state the
issues. Following the meeting, the SRI International representatives were asked
to provide a written statement on each of the issues of the original two lists, and
the panel members were asked to comment on each issue. In the following, we
present each issue and then give SRI International's statement. The statements
have been edited to eliminate redundancies.
The first list of critical issues grew out of planning sessions for the review.
Contributors to these sessions included representatives of NASA-LaRC, SRI
International , Professor Donald F. Stanat, and Professor R. DeMillo. The list
was strongly influenced by references in the open literature to SRI International's
verification methodology. 4, 5 In many of the following comments and position
statements, the phrases "methodology," "verification methodology" and "design
verification technique" should generally be regarded as denoting the same con-
cept.
(1) What kinds of verification tasks must be performed to establish the ultra-
reliability of an aircraft system such as the one that motivated this research?
How was this list of tasks constructed?
Response:
If the reliability required (as for SIFT) is such that it cannot be readily
confirmed by physical experiment, we are necessarily required to extrapolate
the reliability from more easily measured properties and from a mathemati-
cal model of the system. The tasks required for this reliability verificatiofi
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are:
* Definition of the meaning of the term reliability.
* Design of one or more mathematical models of the system, typically:
* A stochastic model from which probabilistic reliability measures
can be derived, and
* Functional models describing the behavior of the physical system.
* Measurement of physical parameters of the system required for these
models, specifically the rate of occurrence of solid and transient faults,
the duration of transient faults, the rate of manifestation of faults as
errors, the stability characteristics of the clocks, and the execution
times of all the programs.
* Experimental or other verification that the functional models are ade-
quate models of the physical system.
* Verification that the various mathematical models of the system are
consistent. In particular, those models that are not physically verifiable
must be shown consistent with, or preferably derivable from, the models
that are.
* Verification that the various mathematical models imply the specified
reliability criterion.
The design verification for SIFT is a demonstration that the specifications
(and, in due course, the Pascal implementation}, regarded as mathematical
objects, have certain mathematical properties. Even were it fully completed,
the design verification could not "prove" that SIFT is "reliable." The extent
to which our confidence in these physical properties is enhanced by the
design verification depends on our confidence that the mathematical models
of SIFT reflect the physical reality, a confidence that may derive from
experience, physical experimentation, or further mathematical analysis. The
value of formal design verification is that it allows us to choose a mathemat-
ical model to match the simplest, most easily measured, and most easily
modeled aspects of the system, and to deduce more complex, or difficult to
measure, properties by rigorous mathematical deduction.
Comments from the peer group:
a. It is important to realize that one does not prove correctness of a sys-
tem; one proves properties of abstractions (models) of the systems.
Therefore, verification cannot guarantee 10-9 probability of failure. The
biggest problem is finding all the right properties to verify, and this is
not a mechanizable process.
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b. Modeling the hardware so that the machine operation and machine code
can. be integrated into the proof scheme is an important and difficult
task. The tools that are used must be verified as well; in this case, for
example, those would include the STP theorem prover and the Pascal
compiler. Because a variant of Pascal is used, and because some of the
code is in machine language, the compiler and code verification problem
becomes substantial and specific to this application. Resources must
also be shown to be adequate -- does everything fit in the available
memory? Are all time constraints met? Are numerical computations
sufficiently accurate?
(2) What is the most complex system that has been verified using this methodol-
ogy? Does the approach scale-up to more complex systems?
Response:
The problem of scaling up lies not in the verification methodology or tools so
much as in our human understanding and ability to maintain clean designs
and specifications for large complex systems, particularly for systems that
cannot be fully understood by a single individual. We have no information
as to whether the scaling factors are better or worse than those for conven-
tional programming practice.
Comments from the peer group:
a. A small section of the abstract specifications of the operating system
routines has been verified. There is no reason why, in principle, the
hierarchical decomposition approach cannot be applied to more complex
systems. Scaling up appears to be a problem of implementation rather
than theory.
b. The SRI methodology may be almost at the limit of its utility in the
partial design proof that was done. The verification system is based on
a form of the predicate calculus, and this may be too weak a modeling
tool. While any system, in principle, could be modeled, in fact it is too
hard to model systems of any realistic complexity. The methodology
needs much higher level primitives that relate to actual programming
constructs (e.g., data objects, program-level operations and control
structures} before it begins to be applicable to real systems.
(3) Does the methodology handle numerical programs, concurrency, and other
language features? Is it appropriate to abstract concurrency out of the code?
Response:
Yes, the methodology does handle a limited form of concurrency. The
design verification of SIFT involved a proof that a set of asynchronously
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interacting computers maintains consistency and cooperates reliably. The
proof was performed by brute force techniques, involving the explicit
representation of time.
A very important aspect of the verification of the correct design of the asyn-
chronous interaction was the structuring of that interaction into a stylized
form. It is our opinion that code verification in the presence of unrestricted
asynchronous interaction, even though possible in principle, is so difficult
that it will never be of practical importance. Successful verification of con-
current systems will always depend on well-structured communication
between processes. Such structure allows separate consideration of the
behavior of program sections within processes and of the interaction between
p ro cesses.
The validity of that separation of considerations requires a metaproof. This
metaproof was beyond the capabilities of STP but our new specification and
verification has sufficient expressiveness and deductive power to undertake
such proofs.
It is our opinion that the structuring of communication between asynchro-
nous processes is not required merely for verification. It is also good pro-
gramming practice in all contexts, and is necessary to obtain a reliable and
maintainable program.
In the SIFT design, there is no communication during process execution.
Design proof is used to verify that the schedules ensure that all input data
are available prior to and throughout process execution. This allows us, at
the lower levels of the proof, in particular for the code proof, to consider
each process execution as an atomic, uninterruptible action. The decision
was necessary to keep the mechanical verification within the state-of-the-art,
but we believe that it was an appropriate decision for SIFT on other
grounds, too.
New techniques are now becoming available that will greatly reduce the cost
and difficulty of specification and verification of asynchronous systems, and
we expect to incorporate one of them, interval logic, (an extension of conven-
tional temporal logic) in our new specification and verification system. We
intend to evaluate the use of interval logic by attempting to verify the
correctness of the highly asynchronous clock synchronization algorithmzof
SIFT (only 35 lines of Pascal declarations and statements, but probably
beyond the ability of any current mechanical verifier).
The problems of verifying numerical programs are mathematical problems
about what properties should be specified for such programs, and about how
to analyze the numerical algorithms so as to prove such properties. This is
an important area for future research in verification although, unfortunately,
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it has received scant attention.
Other language features can complicate verification, such as exception han-
dling. Programs that make use of such a feature may well be difficult to
verify. It is our opinion, however, that equivalent programs, with the same
functionality achieved by use of elementary program constructs and without
use of the higher level language feature, will be even more difficult to verify.
Again, it is the required functionality of the program that must be verified
and is difficult to verify. The availability of a structured language feature
makes the task easier rather than more difficult.
Comments from the peer group:
a. Some aspects of arithmetic are handled, but for the most part, numeri-
cal programs, concurrency, and interrupts are not handled. These are
among the issues that must be addressed. A major weakness of the
methodology is the small effort made to relate what is proved with STP
to the requirements of the actual program under consideration. It is not
clear whether the methodology can be extended to handle these
features.
b. Abstracting concurrency out was necessary with the present state of the
art, but it isn't adequate for a real concurrent system. Ultimately, this
issue must be addressed. Concurrent programs are notorious for very
subtle timing errors which cannot be easily handled by exhaustive test-
ing.
(4) How does the methodology handle errors such as those in hardware, design,
axiomatic specification, programs, and maps between levels?
Response:
The design verification technique cannot address faults in either the highest
level specifications (the requirements) or in the lowest level specifications
(the machine). The probability of error in the highest level specifications is
reduced to the extent that those specifications are short and amenable to
human inspection.
The design verification technique, together with code verification, can only
demonstrate that the specifications and the code, regarded as mathematical
objects, have certain mathematical properties. The demonstration of
appropriate properties may increase our confidence that the specifications,
and code, reflect our intent. Even fully completed, the design verification
cannot "prove" that a system is "reliable".
Comments from the peer group:
a. It is somewhat premature to assess how well errors are handled. The
notion of levels of specification is a good one, but inevitably
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specifications will change, and it would be best if the impact of such
change were constrained to those areas necessarily affected.
b. Part of our difficulty in addressing this issue may result from not under-
standing what an error is. At the lowest level errors can occur in
hardware design or in modeling of the hardware. Errors in specification
at the highest level are errors in judgment; we can only ask that the
methodology gracefully handle changes at that level. As for errors in
the lower level specifications and the mappings between levels, we are
not sure what is meant, since we have not been given a careful
specification of what properties the lower specifications and mappings
must have. Thus, until the methodology is "carefully defined, what con-
stitutes an error will remain unclear.
c. The system depends on a social process to find errors in the
specification and design, a process which appears not to have worked
well in this case.
(5) What quality factors are addressed or affected by the methodology (e.g., tes-
tability, reliability, maintainability, performance)?
Response:
The methodology does not directly address any of these quality factors.
Rather, it is the quality of the design that affects the quality factors. To the
extent that a quality factor can be formally defined as a mathematical pro-
perty, the methodology can be used to increase our confidence in that pro-
perty of the design. We know of no reason why verification should adversely
affect any quality factor.
The design verification technique draws attention to the algorithms of the
design and away from immediate implementation issues. Thus verification
may have a substantial indirect effect on other quality factors.
We see no reason why other structural approaches included to facilitate test-
ing or maintainability should be precluded by the need to verify. Indeed we
envisage that any verified system is likely also to be subjected to very
thorough testing. We note that formal verification can be used to justify
programs that are hard to test, for example programs containing asynchro-
nous interactions.
It is to be hoped that future verification systems will be able to verify non-
trivial performance characteristics of systems. Such verification may be able
to identify potential performance problems that are difficult to identify by
other means. Verification of non-trivial performance properties is still a
research area, however.
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Formal verification does strongly and directly enhance one useful quality,
that of portability. Formally verified programs do not depend on any undo-
cumented nonstandard feature of the system on which they are imple-
mented, and their dependence on documented special features is explicit,
greatly facilitating portability.
Comments from the peer group:
a. Performance is often adversely affected by the program structure
required for verification, and I would expect such an effect from this
methodology or any other. It is essential that performance requirements
be included from the start, and that largely automatic reverification of
modified code be possible.
b. Formal verification does not preclude the use of other techniques to
insure such things as testability and maintainability. Moreover, there is
potential for improving testability and maintainability by following the
hierarchical design and verification approach.
c. Ideally, the design methodology will lead to similarly structured system
design. This can be expected to improve modifiability.
d. The methodology probably does not introduce limitations, but more
complex systems will be harder to specify and verify. This may be a
substantial problem because some kinds of complexity, such as robust
code, are desirable but difficult to characterize in a way that fits in with
formal verification.
e. Verification of a system may lead to undue confidence that it will work
correctly. One possible effect would be similar to that of not putting
very many lifeboats on an "unsinkable" ship; since you know that
nothing can go wrong, there is no need to guard against disaster.
(6) What are the constraints on system structure imposed by the design metho-
dology? How does the methodology influence system design and implemen-
tation? Can an implementation be based on the hierarchical design?
Response:
To a first approximation, the design verification methodology should impose
no constraints on the system structure. To the extent that the system is
clean, elegant and simple, the design verification is easier and quicker. If the
requirements necessitate a more complex system, the design verification will
be correspondingly more complex and expensive. Gratuitous complexity in
the system, leading to unnecessarily difficult design verifications, will have to
be avoided.
The design verification technique encourages, even mandates, clean elegant
orthogonal designs. We do not regard this as a constraint. The design
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characteristics that facilitate verification are characteristics that are recom-
mended practice for all systems. Probably they are even more critical for
systems that must depend on incomplete testing and informal justifications.
It is of the essence of a hierarchical design approach that the more abstract
levels of the design can be quite far removed from the implementation. The
lowest levels of the design specifications are however very close to the code
that implements them; they express, in specification language style, exactly
the same manipulations that the implementing code expresses in imperative
style. Implementation is thus trivial, as it should be, for the aim of a design
specification hierarchy is to capture the design decisions in the specifications.
At any level in the hierarchy, one can provide an implementation of the
abstract machine that meets .the axiomatic specification. But the more
abstract levels of the hierarchy, obviously, provide only an abstract, partial
definition of an implementation. At a lower level, where the design is more
complete, the implementation is more clearly defined. The PrePost level in
the SIFT hierarchy is particularly well-suited to mapping to an immediate
implementation in Pascal -- the data structures and operations are directly
mapped to Pascal data structures and procedures. In fact, we produced a
Pascal implementation of the code from the PrePost specification, although
the code on the system delivered to NASA LaRC was, unfortunately,
developed prior to the availability of the PrePost specification.
Comments .from the peer group:
a. Top-down design is encouraged by this methodology; each routine must
be small and simple. The critical question, then, is whether simplicity
will prevent robustness or even basic functionality. Perhaps only a
trivial system could meet the constraints imposed by this methodology.
b. The structure of the design proof does not have to be reflected in the
final design. Factoring to simplify proof need not correspond to factor-
ing to simplify implementation.
c. It seems that this approach separates the design of a system from the
implementation so well that the two have nothing to do with each
other. Thus, while one could try to use the hierarchical design as a
guide for implementation, this might be ill-advised or even impossible.
It is difficult to address this question better without a careful characteri-
zation of the constraints that characterize an admissible hierarchical
design.
d. A number of changes to the design occurred between the original
description 1 (e.g., 1978 SIFT) and the current version. In the current
version,
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i. priority-based preemptive periodic scheduling is replaced with a
static pre-planned schedule,
ii. task lengths, which were arbitrary in original design, must fit in a
fixed length time slot,
iii. dynamic allocation of tasks to processors is replaced by a static
assignment, and
iv. the complexity of the application programmer's task is substan-
tially increased.
It is not clear why these changes were necessary, but it is likely that a
number of them can be attributed to the constraints imposed by the
methodology. That does not necessarily render them undesirable; we'd
rather have a reliable awkward system than an unreliable pretty one,
but it is probably foolish to think that the methodology does not con-
strain the design.
(7) How do you know axioms are correct? Are the axioms understandable?
Response:
The hierarchical technique allows a very succinct top level specification of
the requirements on the system. It is our belief that this facilitates human
inspection of the specifications and increases our confidence that they do
indeed reflect our true needs.
The design verification technique, together with code verification, can only
demonstrate that the specifications, the code, and the mappings, regarded as
mathematical objects, have certain mathematical properties. The demons-
tration of appropriate properties may increase our confidence that the
specifications, and code, reflect our intent. The extent to which our
confidence in these physical properties is enhanced by the design verification
depends on our confidence that the mathematical models reflect the physical
reality, a confidence that may derive from experience, physical experimenta-
tion, or further mathematical analysis. The value of formal design
verification is that it allows us to choose a mathematical model to match the
simplest, most easily measured , and most easily modeled aspects of the sys-
tem, and to deduce more complex, or difficult to measure, properties by
rigorous mathematical deduction.
Comments from the peer group:
a. The top level is simple enough for a flight engineer to understand, but
this does not mean that he can see that the processing system is correct.
The methodology-could be defined more tightly (to exclude mapping
functions) so that self-containment of the top level specifications is
guaranteed.
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b. Considerable expertise is required to understand the axioms. Maybe
their theorem prover encouraged a clumsy, hard-to-read notation. It is
a serious shortcoming of the methodology that the axioms are hard to
understand at the top level and get harder to understand as one des-
cends to lower levels. It took one and one half days for a panel of
experts to understand the top level. This speaks for itself.
c. SRI International's design verification is impressive, even if it cannot be
understood by those untrained in logic.
d. The top level appears to characterize the system adequately, but it
needs work.
e. The axioms that characterize component hardware must not only be
"correct", but they should also be complete and consistent. They
should describe all states of the machine including failure rates. The
axioms require extensive testing to make them sufficiently believable.
One can write axioms that make it possible to prove the theorems
required, but there is no guarantee that the machine actually makes the
lowest level axioms true at all times.
f. SRI International chose to axiomatize not only the top level, but also
some nonfimdamental concepts that are used in various parts of the
proof. It was shown at the peer review that three such axiomatizations
of conventional mathematical concepts (MOD.AXIOM,
SEQ.EQUALITY.AXIOM, and SET.SELECTION in Section 8 of Inves-
tigation, Development, and Evaluation of Performance Proving for
Fault-Tolerant Computers, Interim Report} 6 are either inconsistent or
incorrect in that they did not correspond to the conventional notions
and that the deviation was apparently not intentional. This demon-
strates that axiomatic descriptions of basic concepts can lead to errors.
An axiomatic description of a large system will be difficult to under-
stand in any case, and is very likely to be inconsistent in some ways.
Unnecessary axiomatization of basic concepts is likely to compound the
problem.
g. The discovery of three bugs in the axioms would be disturbing if we
seriously expected this system to be a production verification system,
but has no direct bearing on the work at this stage.
{8) How are changes in the specification or in the code handled?
Response:
During a design verification (or code verification}, it is necessary to.make
many minor changes to formulas and code. Such changes affect other por-
tions of the proof, which must then be corrected and repeated. It was found
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to be critically necessary that the verification system automatically keep
track of changes and guard the soundness of the evolving proof without
imposing undue restrictions on the order in which the proof is developed.
The result of the verification process is a proof that can be examined and
reproduced independently of how it is arrived at.
Comments from the peer group:
a. Minor code changes are probably handled well. Major algorithm
changes would require changes in the axioms at all levels.
Reverification will be difficult and costly.
b. The verified version already differs from the delivered version, and the
latter is undergoing change. The decoupling of design and code proofs
from the running code is a serious problem. It is impossible to speak of
"SIFT as a verified system" unless a connection is established. Further-
more, changes after that will require reverification. Will they ever resist
changing (even "trivially"} a verified system to handle some convenience
or "improved approach"?
(9) What skills are necessary to use the methodology?
Response:
A user of the design verification technique and STP must have an under-
standing of mathematical logic approximating a typical undergraduate
course in that topic. No understanding of the internal mechanisms of STP
is required.
The use of design verification does not in any way reduce the amount of
experience with, and understanding of, the application that is required of the
designer. The quality of the design and the feasibility of design verification
are entirely dependent on the skill of the designer.
Comments from the peer group:
a. Significant mathematical sophistication seems to be required of both the
designer and the application programmer. It is not clear to what extent
the application of formal methods will ever become easy and common-
place, i.e., easy to use by those untrained in logic. Familiarity with the
particular application is probably less important than familiarity with
formal methods.
(10) Does the methodology facilitate the apportioning of validation effort accord-
ing to the level of risk involved for different kinds of errors?
Response:
The selection of properties to be specified as requirement on the system by
the top level specifications may reflect an assessment of the properties that
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are most important. Similarly, the selection of the lowest level, below which
verification is not carried, may also reflect an assessment of risk. For exam-
ple, a decision has to be made as to whether the lowest level of the
verification should extend to axiomatic specifications only, to the Pascal
code, to the binary machine code, to the microprogram, to chip level logic
design, to the component level design, or even into analog properties of sem-
iconductors.
However, once decisions have been made as to the top-level and bottom-level
specifications, the hierarchical design verification technique regards all pro-
perties as equal in importance, and is equally rigorous and effective against
all errors that fall within its scope.
Comments from the peer group:
a. Ideally, it would be possible to concentrate on particular properties so
as to deal with them more rigorously than with others.
(11) How does the methodology constrain the end-user?
Response:
To a first approximation, the design verification methodology should impose
no constraints on the end-user or his system. One must distinguish between
constraints imposed by the SIFT. design and constraints imposed by the
needs of formal verification; we address the latter.
An application program, like any other program, is expected to satisfy a
functional specification and to comply with an axiom concerning scheduling
frames. It may also be required to comply with resource limitations (time,
space, use of shared resources, etc.). If the program interacts with other pro-
grams, it will have to obey a protocol specification.
Comments from the peer group:
a. It is not clear what restrictions on the application programs are implied
by the design proof. These restrictions should be stated in the require-
ments documents.
b. The methodology forces simplicity of design and may do so to an unrea-
sonable degree. Non-preemptive scheduling (all tasks must fit in a fixed
time slot} is a constraint that apparently evolved from application of
the methodology, but one cannot know how that will affect the pro-
grammer until some application programs are written.
c. If the application programmer is considered to be the end-user, then the
SIFT experience would suggest that he may be affected negatively.
Compared to the description in "SIFT: Design and Analysis of a Fault-
Tolerant Computer for Aircraft Control," 1 the present system, accord-
ing to Butler 7 requires much more of the application programmer. He
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must write his programs so that they all execute within a specified" fixed
period. He must assign tasks to processors and build schedule tables,
and he must do so for every possible combination of working and faulty
processors. He must also build voting tables that correspond to each
precalculated schedule table. Each of these additional responsibilities
makes the application programmer's task harder, and it makes it harder
to ensure that he's done his job correctly.
(12) Does the verification methodology apply to the application software?
Response:
The SIFT design does not tolerate errors in the application software. To the
extent that the correct operation of the application programs is necessary for
the reliable operation of the system, the application programmer must verify
his programs, or use other techniques to establish that his programs are
sufficiently reliable.
Comments from the peer group:
a. Correctness of the total system depends on correctness of the applica-
tion programs, but confidence may be enhanced by partial verification.
Verifying only the kernel routines is worthwhile, even if the application
programs are not subjected to the same rigorous review.
b. Clearly, the applications must meet the same reliability criteria as the
rest of the system if total reliability is to be preserved.
(13) To what extent does formal mathematical verification address the goal of
total system validation? To what extent does mechanization of proofs con-
tribute to the verification of programs and confidence in the programs?
Response:
Design verification is merely a demonstration that the specifications (and the
code), regarded as mathematical objects, have certain properties. The extent
to which the verification process addresses the actual physical behavior of
the system depends on the degree of confidence that these mathematical
objects reflect the physical reality. This confidence may derive from experi-
ence, physical experimentation, or further mathematical analysis. The value
of formal design verification is that it allows us to choose, a mathematical
model to match the simplest, most easily measured, and most easily modeled
aspects of the system, and to deduce more complex, or difficult to measure,
properties by rigorous mathematical deduction.
The extent to which design verification can address a total system depends
only on the extent to which that total system can be modeled mathemati-
cally. Clearly, the more of the system that is to be modeled, the more com-
plex the mathematical model becomes and the more difficult deduction
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within the model becomes. It is clear that the techniques applied to a por-
tion of SIFT address only a restricted aspect of that total system. As new
and improved verification systems become available, investigation of more
complete systems will become possible.
It has been our experience that mechanical verification is essential if we are
to have the highest level of confidence in our proofs, and thus in our pro-
grams. During the design verification effort, so many minor faults were
found in the SIFT specifications that we would now have little confidence in
any proof that has not been subjected to mechanical checking.
During the various phases of the design verification, manual and mechanical,
we also found four faults in the design that required changes to the imple-
mentation. These design faults all related to inadequate fault tolerance in
special circumstances. Even with the benefit of knowledge of the design
fault, we are unable to envision any test sequence that could have been
expected to expose the design fault. One can have no confidence that pro-
grams subjected to testing alone do not contain subtle design faults such as
those.
But, however complete and rigorous a formal verification is, the properties
verified are only properties of a mathematical model. Formal verification
necessarily makes an assumption about the relationships between that model
and the real system, relationships that can and should be investigated.
Other forms of validation, such as program testing, make different assump-
tions from those of formal verification. It is our opinion that those assump-
tions are far less likely to be justifiable than the assumptions made for for-
mal design verification, but it is very important that they are different.
Consequently, it is possible to use testing to investigate and substantiate the
claimed relationships between the formal model and the actual system.
Thus testing remains an essential complement to verification in raising our
level of confidence in our programs and systems.
Comments from the peer group:
a. The SIFT verification effort definitely shows that a combination of
existing theory, methodology, technology, expertise, and review can pro-
duce proofs of properties about abstractions of the underlying system.
b. There is no real alternative to formal verification for this kind of relia-
bility. Mechanization of proofs is vital for large proofs and detects
errors in proofs more reliably than inspection by humans. The value of
verification is twofold. First, it is a totally independent approach to
finding errors from "walk-throughs" and other code-scanning tech-
niques. Second, the rigor of having to reconcile the implementation
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axiomatization with the "performance" constraints imposed by the next
higher level axioms via generating proofs forces fresh looks at various
aspects of the design and implementation.
c. I feel strongly that formal modeling of the total system, formal
verification of that model, and direct, automatic generation of code
from the formal model are required if an overall system is to be reliable.
Ad hoc, informal methods are hopeless. The complexity of a system
like SIFT suggests that mechanization of large parts of the verification
is essential, regardless of the methodology used. Thus, formal modeling
and automatic verification aids are essential.
However, the technical approach taken is too low-level in its modeling
abilities and is therefore hopelessly inadequate for actual systems. But
the potential of formal verification for SIFT-like systems should not be
judged on the basis of this effort.
(14) What other validation activities should be used in conjunction with this
methodology? Are they compatible?
Response:
We know of four general approaches to improving the reliability of designs
(typically but not exclusively software designs): software fault tolerance
techniques (such as recovery blocks and N-version programming, but also
including other less structured techniques), testing in a simulated environ-
ment, testing in actual operation, and verification of various degrees of for-
mality. These techniques are by no means mutually exclusive.
The inclusion of software fault tolerance code into a program, aside from
increasing its size and complexity, introduces two special verification prob-
lems. If code is introduced that can be reached only through a test detecting
some form of error condition, it is possible that the verification may fail to
check that code, the required conditions being established by demonstrating
that the test must "always" fail. Similar problems arise in testing such
code. Consequently, redundant code, if ever exercised, may be found to be
very unreliable. The second problem is that heuristic repairs to data struc-
tures may be very difficult to justify, formally or even informally.
The Recovery Block technique does not suffer seriously from these two prob-
lems and appears to us to be quite compatible with design and code
verification.
Comments from the peer group:
a. Compatibility with other activities is probably feasible, but, to the
knowledge of the panel, it has not been investigated.
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b. Any others that are available can be used.
c. Extensive testing and high-level programming languages with clear con-
trol structures are necessary.
d. It is assumed that a number of tasks are performed perfectly by the
designers and implementors. These tasks include (1) specification of the
system, (2) construction of a failure model, (3} verification of the code,
and (4} construction (and therefore performance} of the verification sys-
tem. These assumptions invite disaster because we are not generally
able to perform the tasks perfectly. It appears that the assumptions
made awkward the use of techniques that would be helpful when an
assumption fails. Maintainability and robustness were not goals in the
SIFT work, and any system built with this methodology would suffer as
a consequence.
(15) Are design proofs in the absence of code proofs relevant? Do design proofs
interface well with the code verification?
Response:
Each level in the SIFT specification hierarchy is the specification of an
abstract machine. Using incremental design proof, each level is shown suc-
cessively to be an implementation of the next higher level in the hierarchy.
In our view, the "code" is merely one level in this hierarchy. Clearly, the
closer that the physical implementation is to the level of abstract machine
that has been proven to have certain properties, the more credible the claims
about the "correctness" of the system actually executing. In this context, of
course, the Pascal code is running on an abstract Pascal machine, itself run-
ning on a BDX930 machine, etc. The lower levels must be shown or
assumed to be consistent with the physical implementation. The decision as
to the appropriate level of design detail to carry the proof is really a ques-
tion of cost-effectiveness.
The traditional verification condition generation paradigm bridging the gap
between code and specification obscures much of the insight on the part of
the designer ,as to why the code meets its specification. We are currently
working on modifying this paradigm to be able to reason about properties of
abstract and concrete programs in the same manner -- eliminating the
currently awkward interface.
Comments from the peer group:
a. The design proofs produce the PrePost conditions to be used in the code
proofs; thus they play a vital part in preparing for code verification.
The work in this area is very impressive.
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b. If the design proof is well done, it should simplify construction of the
code proof. However, the usefulness of the SIFT design proof is suspect
in view of how difficult the axioms are to understand and the fact that
the code proof was never carried out correctly.
c. Design proofs in isolation from the code and coding proofs are worth-
less. The design proofs must eventually be reconciled with the code,
and this task appears to be impossibly difficult.
4.0 PREVIOUSLY REPORTED RESEARCH
ACCOMPLISHMENTS
Scientific workers are expected to describe their accomplishments in a way
that will not mislead or misinform. Members of the peer review panel felt that
many publications and conference presentations of the SRI International
verification work have not accurately presented the accomplishments of the pro-
ject; several panel members, as a result of the peer review, felt that much of what
they thought had been done had indeed not been done. Because of these
misunderstandings, a substantial part of the panel's effort was devoted to trying
to establish what had been accomplished. Several panel members expressed seri-
ous concerns regarding both the possible effects of such misunderstandings on
those seeking to apply the work and the reactions that might follow the discovery
that the work had been overstated.
The research claims that the panel considered to be unjustified are primarily
in two categories; the first concerns the methodology purportedly used by SRI
International to validate SIFT, and the second concerns the degree to which the
validation had actually been done.
Many publications and conference presentations concerning SIFT appear to
have misrepresented the accomplishments of the project. In many cases, the
misrepresentation stems from omission of facts rather than from inclusion of
falsehood. The following quotations are illustrative.
"This paper describes the methodology employed to demon-
strate rigorously that the SIFT computer meets its reliability
requirements." 4
"The formal proof, that a SIFT system in a 'safe' state operates
correctly despite the presence of arbitrary faults, has been completed
all the way from the most abstract specification to the PASCAL pro-
gram. This proof has been performed using STP, a new specification
and verification system, designed and developed at SRI International.
Except where explicitly indicated, every specification exhibited in this
paper has been mechanically proven consistent with the requirements
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on SIFT and with the Pascal implementation. The proof remains to
be complete d that the SIFT executive performs an appropriate, safe,
and timely reconfiguration in the .presence of faults." 5
Quotes such as these misled the panel into believing that the methodology
and proof of SWT were in a far more mature state than was seen at the peer
review.
5.0 CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of the peer review was to evaluate the role of formal
verification techniques in system validation, focusing on the verification part of
the SIFT work.
In general, SRI believes that the SRI proof effort, in its incomplete and only
recently formalized state,* represents a substantial contribution to specification
theory. Clearly, the verification process is only as good as the specification of the
system. To address this problem, SRI utilized a parameterized hierarchy of
specifications. With this hierarchy, it can be guaranteed that any behavior
observable from the simple top-level specifications will in fact follow from the
lowest detailed level specification.
Whether other systems or methodologies could address similar issues, SRI
believes that the SRI effort goes far in actually accomplishing this. This is in
contrast to demonstration of a collection of correctness properties expressed and
proved at the level of the code. In many cases, the specifications submitted for
the user's scrutiny are as long as and more difficult than the actual code.
Clearly, this effort has not been completed. The hierarchy has not yet been
carried down to the actual Pascal Code, assembly language, or transistor level.
The more elementary the components of the bottom level in the hierarchy, the
more believable the proof. It would be a mistake, however, to discount the SRI
proof effort because the hierarchy has not yet been carried down to a "running
implementation" level.
The incompleteness of the SIFT verification exercise caused concern at the
peer review. Many panel members who expected (from the literature ) a more
extensive proof were disillusioned. It was the consensus of the panel that SRI's
accomplishment claims were strongly misleading. The panel members felt it was
the responsibility of researchers not only to reveal the full potential of their work
(as SRI did) but also to carefully define the status of the work, clearly indicating
* Subsequent to the peer review, SRI generated a formal description of their methodol-
ogy which appears in Appendix B.
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what had and had not yet been done.
The methodology, as it was described at the peer review and in the docu-
mentation provided, was not specified in a way that would provide substantial
help in validating a system. It placed no constraints on the form of the axioms
or how the formal logic would be used. It did not specify what constitutes a
'mapping' between layers, leaving open such matters as consistency, completeness
and form of these mappings.* But perhaps the state of the art (or at least of this
project) is best revealed by the fact that work (described in Appendix B)
intended to address some of the panel's concerns led SRI workers to conclude
that their proof was incomplete in a way they had not previously perceived (see
Appendix C).
Members of the review panel were doubtful that the hierarchical approach
used in the design proofs can be classified as a methodology, although the
approach taken by SRI to validate SIFT is novel and notable. They had serious
doubt about the claim that the correctness of the system design can be judged by
examining only easily understood high-level functional specifications. The claim
falters on two counts. First, the difficulty encountered by members of the panel
in understanding the top-level assertions of the SIFT operating system makes it
seem likely that inadequacies or errors in the specification could easily be over-
looked, even by someone familiar with the application. Second, some members of
the panel were concerned that, even though the understanding of the top-level
assertions might be perfect, underlying models in the hierarchy could be con-
structed in ways that logically imply the levels above while betraying the
intended model.
In summary, a meaningful formal proof methodology was not clearly
described to the peer reviewers. Consequently, there was doubt expressed as to
the existence of a detailed methodology. Subsequent work submitted by SRI
International in Appendices B and C may support the claim of a feasible metho-
dology, but this work was not available to the panel.
The review panel, because of preoccupation with establishing the existence of
a SRI formal proof methodology, never properly addressed the role of formal
techniques in total system validation and the state-of-the-art of formal proof
methodology development.
* The methodology description in Appendix B clarifies some of the questions raised at
the review but was unavailable during the review process.
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APPENDIX A
OVERVIEW OF SRI ACCOMPLISKMENTS
SRI International
Menlo Park, California
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The purpose of the "Performance Proving" project, under which SIFT
design verification efforts were performed, was to advance the state of the art in
verification, rather than to prove SIFT, just as the objective of the companion
SIFT project was to advance the state of the art in fault tolerant architecture
rather than to build a computer. Thus, some of what was done was valuable sci-
ence but not directly relevant to the SIFT design verification itself; some was
investigations that failed or were subsequently evaluating an experimental facility
that could possibly be used to aid in analytically proving the correct performance
of embedded fault-tolerant computers in aircraft flight control systems.
The specific tasks in our statement of work were:
(1) To extend the performance proof technology to handle systems, and
specifically handle fault-tolerant computers and flight control systems.
(2} To develop an experimental proof facility to automate the proofs.
(3) To demonstrate the technology and facility by design proving the SIFT
fault-tolerant computer.*
When we started the work, we were only vaguely aware of the difficult
technical issues that had to be faced to verify a real-time (and "real") operating
system, let alone real application programs. Among the difficult technical issues
that we quickly became aware of are:
* how to express easily understood requirements for complex systems,
* how to handle concurrency that is driven by hardware interrupts and not
easily expressible using a high-level programming language,
* how to verify the lower levels of the system (assembly code and hardware
logic),
* how to model the environment in which the computer is embedded (e.g., the
"real" state of the aircraft and the computer hardware, which is not cap-
tured by any observable variable), and
* how to verify performance properties that vitally impact the correctness of a
system (e.g., will the application programs terminate within their allotted
time and run within their allocated space).
Early in the project we identified the need for what we subsequently called
design proof. Our ultimate aim was to use as a requirement the Markov reliabil-
ity model. As it became clear that we would not be able to prove anything about
failure rates or about the distribution of the time interval from the occurrence of
a fault tothe instant at which errors show up to a voter, we decided to abandon
* Although the task statement only indicated "design" proof, it was our objective to car-
ry out a verification of running code. Furthermore, at the beginning of the project we did
not fully appreciate the value of design proof.
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this approach. Instead, we placed our effort on a functional requirement, which
culminated in the I/O model. Subsequently, we introduced the three lower level
models, each of which captures a related set of key decisions; for example, the
Replication Model axiomation task assignment and replication, and voting.
Regarding the verification of code, we had hoped to separately consider the
Pascal portion of the operating system and that portion which had to be written
in assembly code. We did not want to consider any approach based on verifying
the compiler. In the end, we never made much progress on the assembly code.
Moreover, the Pascal used for the delivered version SIFT involved some hooks
into the hardware which we did not formalize. (For example, overloading of the
assignment statement was used to indicate broadcasting of a buffer to all proces-
sors.) Hence, a cleaned up version of the Pascal code was constructed. The code
we did consider for verification was close to the Pascal portion of the delivered
SIFT system, and handled most of the features that were addressed in the design
verification, but was not the running executive.
Our initial overall approach, in retrospect naively selected, was to use HDM
as the basis for describing a system. In principle HDM as it existed at the begin-
ning of the project was suitable, being capable of describing hierarchically-
constructed programs and models, having a specification language (SPECIAL)
that supports abstraction and is linkable to existing theorem provers, being able
to support high level programming languages, and allowing for different kinds of
implementations (e.g., combinations of hardware, assembly language and high
level programming language). In anticipation of HDM being suitable, we started
to develop a verification system based on HDM and the Boyer/Moore theorem
prover (see below).
However, as we started to specify and verify SIFT we became aware of cer-
tain deficiencies of the approach. HDM, requiring that each operation be atomic,
did not fully support concurrency. Before we could extend the HDM model of
computation to allow for concurrent operations, it was necessary for us to fully
understand what was required to specify and verify concurrent programs. The
Boyer/Moore work described below was a first step in this direction which, unfor-
tunately, did not lead to an extension of HDM in time. This prevented us from
producing a mechanical verification of thetheorem that relates to the nonin-
terference of the SIFT processors on each other -- at least as related to the
verification.
In addition, we uncovered some deficiencies in the SPECIAL language that
led to longer and clumsier than necessary specifications. For example, SPECIAL
does not support parameterized modules meaning, for example, that a SET of
INTEGER and SET of WORD cannot be described with a single specification
that is instantiated. Moreover, SPECIAL requires model-theoretic specifications
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{complete specifications), while several of the more abstract models in the SIFT
design hierarchy seemed to be better specified with property-theoretic
specifications (incomplete specifications). We also experienced some difficulty in
using the Boyer/Moore theorem prover, particularly for the design proofs. As
described below, we were not able to effectively generate lemmas from which the
Boyer/Moore theorem prover could generate the proofs. STP provides
parameterized types, the ability (through quantifiers and other features) to pro-
duce property-theoretic specifications, and a level of man-machine interaction
that we found better suited to human-assisted proof.
The SIFT design verification, manual as well as mechanical, has produced
many interesting results, among them:
* interactive consistency and Byzantine agreement,
* reliable clock synchronization algorithms,
* the demonstration (still continuing) of the correspondence between the states
and transitions of a Markov reliability model and a functional model of a
system,
* the hierarchical design proof technique,
* the STP verifier.
The work undertaken under task (I) was:
The development of a method for verifying numerical algorithms (Milton W.
Green). The method factors the proof into steps: verification assuming
infinite precision followed by verification of precision properties. We illus-
trated the method on the King-Floyd exponentiation program, proving it
mechanically using the Boyer/Moore theorem prover. We hope this work
will provide us with the technology required to verify application programs
whose specification involves an accuracy requirement.
The verification of a 6cry simple control system (Robert S. Boyer, Milton W.
Green and J. Moore). The control system assures that a vehicle subject to
wind disturbances remains on course. The specification is interesting in that
it includes that state of the vehicle which is not captured by any observable
variable. A mechanical verification was carried out using the Boyer/Moore
theorem prover. It was our hope that this work would inspire others to
tackle the specification and verification of real flight control systems.
The verification of hardware logic (Robert E. Shostak). The method
developed was analogous to that of Floyd for software. Basic components,
such as gates, flip-flops, and registers were axiomatized and hand proofs were
developed for a frequency comparator. A mechanical proof of the Muller C-
element, a circuit that interfaces asynchronous elements, was also carried
out. It was hoped that this work would be the basis for verifying the
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hardware logic of a real computer, but any serious attempts in this direction
are in the future.
The formal definition of computer architectures (Robert S. Boyer and J
Moore). A formal definition was developed in the Computational Logic for
the Bendix BDX930 processor. This work was important in showing that
the instruction set of a real processor could be formally defined in a logic
supported by a theorem prover. In addition, some inconsistencies in the
informal definition were uncovered. Unfortunately, the definition was just
too big to be useful.
The work performed under task (2) consisted of:
The formal definition of an HDM subset (Robert S. Boyer and J. Moore).
This definition describes the meaning of an HDM verification of a SPECIAL
module. This very elegant definition was to be used as the basis for arguing
about the soundness of the HDM-Pascal verification system, which was even-
tually abandoned.
Continued development of the Boyer/Moore theorem prover (Robert S.
Boyer and J. Moore). The majority of the support for this development came
from ONR and NSF. The NASA project supported the extension of the
theorem prover to negative numbers.
The Meta-VCG (Mark S. Moriconi and Richard L. Schwartz). This tool
generates verification conditions from a program and a specification, much as
a conventional VCG. The Meta-VCG is however language independent and
accepts as input a Hoare sentence definition of the programming language
semantics.
The HDM Pascal Verification System (Dwight Hare). This is a conventional
VCG type program verification system, using a VCG derived from the
Meta-VCG and accepting SPECIAL specifications and Pascal programs. It
was initially designed to interface to the Boyer/Moore theorem prover, but
was modified at the last moment to interface to STP. Unfortunately, this
modification was not fully completed, thus requiring manual intervention
into the verification conditions before they can be proved.
The STP Verification System (Robert E. Shostak, Richard L. Schwartz, and
P. M. Melliar-Smith). This system is based on decision procedures
developed under an AFOSR contract by Robert Shostak, extended to pro-
vide a strongly typed first order logic with schemes and the beginnings of a
man-machine symbiosis for proof development.
The work performed under task (3) was:
Development of abstract reliability models for SIFT (Robert E. Shostak and
Leslie B. Lamport). This was our first attempt to develop an abstract
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statement of the functional properties of SIFT and relate to a model close to
the operating system.
Development of design specifications for SIFT using SPECIAL (P. M.
Melliar-Smith). This produced a formal definition of the Lamport and Shos-
tak models expressed in SPECIAL. For the reasons described above and
reflecting the inadequacies of SPECIAL, this work was abandoned.
The proof of the dispatching code for the SIFT executive (Robert S. Boyer
and J S. Moore). This work aimed to prove that a dispatcher, written in
BDX930 machine instructions, would handle interrupts and invoke the exe-
cution of application tasks. Ultimately, the aim was to demonstrate coordi-
nation of six asynchronous processors at the machine instruction level. The
task failed, in part because the formal definition of the BDX930 completely
filled the store of the theorem proving environment, and in part because we
did not develop an appropriate specification for the requirements on a
dispatcher. In commencing this task, we had hoped to provide a link from
the real dispatcher (the workhorse of SIFT) to our design proof. In retros-
pect, the verification of the dispatcher might have been feasible if carried
out with respect to the specification that the constraints imposed by the
scheduler preclude task interference.
Design proof of SIFT using the Boyer/MooT:e theorem prover (Milton W.
Green and J S. Moore). This work started with a Pascal "implementation"
of the I/O model, which enabled us to test the specification with real data.
Following this, we wrote the I/O and Replication models in the
Boyer/Moore theory. The verification attempt did not succeed because of
the difficulties we had in generating the proofs in the Boyer/Moore theory.
However, it should be noted that J. Moore did succeed in replicating the
STP proof of correspondence between the two top level models of the SIFT
design hierarchy, using the "axiom" and "proof-check" features at the
Boyer/Moore theorem prover.
The top-level specifications of SIFT, the I/O specifications, are best
expressed as very abstract property theoretic specifications which attempt to
express only the essential requirements on the system for it to behave reli-
ably. Such specifications, we believe, are necessarily partial and leave much
free to be defined as the design is elaborated. But the computational logic,
based on recursive function theory, requires total, well founded definitions of
all functions. This results in the specification of much auxiliary mechanism
and yields a specification that is much more specific than is necessary or
desirable.
The Boyer/Moore theorem prover attempts to be a fully automatic theorem
prover, capable of proving theorems without human interaction, and as such
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it is probably the most advanced in the world. This automatic capability is
provided by sophisticated, and very complex, heuristics. Unfortunately,
even with these heuristics, the theorem prover is not able to prove non-
trivial theorems without human assistance, provided in the form of lemmas.
Unfortunately the human assistance has to predict the needs of the heuris-
tics that will generate the automatic proof. The normal user does not have
the detailed understanding of the internal structure of the prover and its
heuristics needed to provide this assistance.
The design proof of SIFT using STP (P. M. Melliar-Smith and Richard L.
Schwartz). This proof was started towards the end of the project, and even
now is not yet complete. It Was however successful in demonstrating the
feasibility of design proofs of non-trivial properties of SIFT. In particular,
the proof verifies that a SIFT system in a safe state will execute the
scheduled tasks, provide them with correct inputs and mask processor faults
in their results. The proof does not demonstrate correct or timely
reeonfiguration, nor does it connect the design to the Markov model on
which reliability predictions are based. SRI International is currently being
funded by NASA-LaRC to continue the proof using new tools, with greater
rigor, and to extend it to cover reeonfiguration, interactive consistency and
clock synchronization. We would also hope to incorporate the Markov
model into the model hierarchy.
The verification of the Pascal code sections derived from the SIFT design
specifications (Dwight Hare). As indicated above, these programs and their
proofs do not involve any arguments about concurrency. We proved proper-
ties about sequential programs, relying on the design proof to assure us that
the programs did not interfere with each other. This, too, was started too
late in the project and after the Pascal verification system had been abruptly
converted from one prover to another. SRI found the STP style of
automated proof to be more effective than that of the Boyer/Moore theorem
prover in carrying out the design verification of SIFT, although we confess
to being somewhat biased. In particular, the quantification feature of STP
allowed us to more easily write incomplete specifications, and the parameter-
ization feature led to reasonably general theories. Furthermore, we found
the style of interaction afforded by STP, although often tedious, to be more
natural. On the other hand, skilled users of the Boyer/Moore theorem
prover appreciate its extensive heuristics. The Pascal code sections verified
were only those required to support the incomplete design proof, and was
not the code of the running SIFT. In particular, the global executive,
reeonfiguration, interactive consistency, and clock synehronization were not
verified.
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APPENDIX B
FOUNDATIONS FOR DESIGN PROOF METHODOLOGY*
A result of Peer Review; provided by Jose Meseguer, SRI Internationul, to further ex-
plain methodology.
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The purpose of this appendix is to make explicit the mathematical basis of
the method employed in the proof done on SIFT so that its soundness, generality,
and what mathematically can be accomplished by its use can be more clearly
perceived by everybody.
The goal of the proof approach is, of course, to show that an executable
implementation at the bottom level of the hierarchy satisfies all the properties
asserted in the top level specification. In this way, a system can be understood in
terms of the simpler high level specification without reference to the details of its
low level implementation. The specifications themselves need not be executable;
what is being shown is that any executable bottom level implementation can be
viewed as a high level abstract machine.
1.1 Preliminaries
A many-sorted first order signature (with equality) is a triple E -- (S,F,H),
where S is a set of sorts (denoted s, sI, etc.), F is a set of function symbols
that comes with an "arity" function ar:F_(S*xS) (its elements are denoted by f,
g, etc., and if ar(f}---(sl...sn,s) by f: sl...sn--_s), and H a set of predicate sym-
bols also with an arity function ar: P---_S+ (elements are denoted by P, Q, etc.)
and such that for each sort s in S there is a distinguished equality predicate sym-
bol--s, i.e., ar(-%)--ss.
The first order language of _], denoted L(E), is defined inductively in the
usual way: first terms with variables (denoted t, V, etc.) are built using F, then
atomic formulas are built from terms using l'I, and then formulas (denoted A, B,
etc.} are built from atomic formulas by means of the usual logical connectives.
A first order theory (with equality) is a pair T--(E,F) where F is a set
of formulas in L(E) (called the axioms of the theory). By the language of T,
L(T) we just mean the language of its signature, L(_). The theory T--(2,r) is
called S-sorted if the set of sorts of E is S. A model M of an S-sorted first
order theory T=(_,F) is an S-sorted sequence of sets M--M_s_s together with: (i)
for each f: sl...sn---.s in F a function fM:Mslx...xMsn---_Ms; (ii) for each P in H
(other than the equality predicate symbols) with, say ar(P)---sl...sn, a function
PM: MslX'"XMsn-"* {true,false} and sucll that M satisfies all the axioms in F.
(The notion of satisfaction is the obvious one, i.e., interpreting the equality predi-
cate symbols as the ordinary equality predicate, each term t in L(T) denotes a
function tM from sorts of M to a sort of M, and each formula A denotes a truth-
valued function A M from sorts of M; we then say that M satisfies a formula A,
denoted M ]= A, iff A M has the constant value true.) The class of all the
models of a theory T will be denoted Mod(T.) Given a theory T, if a formula A
in L(T) is satisfied by all the models of T we will write T [-- A, and say that A is
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a semantic consequence of T.
By a syntactic consequence of a theory T we mean a formula A such that
there is a finite subset F 0 of F such that A can be deduced from F0 by the usual
rules of many sorted first order logic with equality; we then write T [- A. By the
completeness theorem for first order logic we know that a formula is valid in all
models of a theory if and only if it is derivable from the axioms, i.e.,
T I-- A if and only if T]-A
1.2 Views
It is very common to have situations in which two different logical theories
are naturally related. Whenever there is a relationship between theories, a
corresponding relationship is induced between their models; for instance, if a
theory T t extends or enriches the language and the axioms of T (i.e., T t has
perhaps additional new function and predicate symbols and possibly additional
axioms) then the inclusion TCT _ provides a view of T t from T, and allows us to
view or regard each model of T _ as a model of T, by just forgetting about the
additional function and predicate symbols. For instance, the inclusion of the
theory of semigroups into the theory of groups allows us to view each group as a
semigroup. In other common situations, however, the relationship between two
theories is more involved than just a simple inclusion; for instance, every boolean
algebra can be viewed as a boolean ring, and this corresponds to a view of the
theory of boolean algebras from the theory of boolean rings in which the ring
operations are expressed as derived expressions from the basic boolean operations
of union, intersection, and complement. In logic textbooks such as Shoenfield's
Mathematical Logic, 8 Section 4.7, views are called "interpretations"; the term
"view" is due to Goguen and Burstall, who treat views in full generality in their
recent work on "institutions" 9 and show that their basic properties do not
depend on the kind of logic chosen: equational, first order, ..., etc. In this Section
we explain the basic facts about views for first order logic; this will provide the
basis for our discussion of the SIFT hierarchical specification and verification in
Section 4.
Definition 1: Given an S-sorted theory T-'(E,F) and an St-sorted theory
T l ---(E,F) a view of T I from T is a pair V--(v,V), where v: S--*Sr is a function
and V: (F[.JH)--,L(T t) is a function mapping each function symbol f of E to a
term V(f) in L(T _ ), and each equality predicate symbol --s to "-'v(s), and any
other predicate symbol P of E to a formula V(P) in L(T t) in such a way that:
1. "Arity is preserved", i.e. if f: sl...sn-.s in F, then the term V(f) will denote a
function V(f)M: Mv(sl)x...xMv(sn)--_Mv(s) in each model M of T t, and similarly
if P in H has ar(P)--sl...sn, then V(P) will denote a function
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V(P)M:Mv(sl)x...xMv(sn)---* {true,false} in each model M of T'; note that the
map V can be extended by induction to a function V:L(T)_L(TI), i.e., we
can think of V .as a translation from the language of T into that of T'.
2. "The translation of the axioms is provable", i.e., for any axiom A in F we
have
W'I-V(A)
We denote such a view by V: T_T t. Given a view V: T--*T r, each T I model
M can be viewed as a T model V*(M), with V*
(M)s----Mv(s),fv,(g)--V(f)g, and PV.(M}----V(P)M. It is clear that V*(M) satisfies
the axioms F, since for any such axiom A we have AV.(M) -- V(A)M , and M I-
V(A) (thus V*(M)[-- A), since T' ]- V(A). In other words, V* is a well defined
function
V*: Mod(T')--Mod(W)
By the completeness theorem we know that a theory is consistent if and only
if it has a model. Thus from the definition of view above we obtain:
Corollary 2. If V: T---,T t is a view and T _ is consistent, then T is con-
sistent.
A very important property of views is that they are "theorem preserving".
We give a simple proof of this'result using the completeness theorem. The same
result for a quite restricted notion of view is the "Interpretation Theorem" in
Shoenfield's text, s pp. 62-63; for a fully general treatment allowing different log-
ics see Goguen & Burstall. 9
Theorem 3: For V: T_T' a view and A a formula in L(T), if T ]- A then T' ]-
V(A).
Proof: By the completeness theorem, T I- A if and only if T I= A, i.e., M I= A
for each M in Mod(W). In particular, we then have V*(M') I-- A for each V*(M')
in V*(Mod(T'), i.e., M'I-- V(A) for each M' in Mod(T'), i.e., W'I- V(A), again by
the completeness theorem, q.e.d.
A very useful corollary of this theorem is that views can be composed to
yield new views, i.e., they form a "category."
Corollary 4: If (v,V): T_T' and (v', V_): TI_T" are views, then (v'ov,V _
oV):T---.T' I is also a view.
Proof: For each axiom A in F of T we have T _ I" V(A) by hypothesis, and
then
T" I-V' (V(A)) by the above theorem, q.e.d.
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1.3 The Proof of Correctness in SIFT
The notion of view just given provides a foundation for the method of
hierarchical specification and verification employed in the proof of SIFT.
The authors specified the SIFT system in a "hierarchical way" and this
means precisely that they provided a sequence of first order theories T1,...,T n (T 1
the "top level" and T n the "bottom level" specifications) and for each level a
view of the next level below, i.e., views Vi: Ti_.Ti+t, l(i(n-1. The proof con-
sisted precisely in showing mechanically that each of these Vi was indeed a view,
i.e, that
Ti+ 1 [ - Vi (A) for each axiom A in T i
This formalizes the method used in the proof. Although the axioms corresponding
to each T i are grouped together in the report, the report itself does not make
explicit enough what the signatures and the views are; STP did not provide
mechanical support for hierarchies at the time when the proof was done. This
forced all the levels to be lumped together into a single unstructured theory.
Several important consequences follow immediately from the above observa-
tion and the results on views proved in the previous section, namely:
1. Since views are closed under composition, any model M of the bottom level
theory T n (i.e., any T n "machine") becomes, once the correctness of the
views has been established, a model of the top level theory Tl, i.e. a
"correct" T 1 "virtual machine", namely VI,(...(Vn.(M )...).
2. Once the views have been proved, consistency of all the theories TI,...,Tn_ 1
follows for free from the consistency of the bottom level theory Tn, and
that in turn follows from exhibiting a T n machine, i.e., an "implementation,"
by the completeness theorem.
3. Theorems of the top level, simplest theory, follow automatically as theorems
of the lowest level implementation, by Theorem 3.
1.4 Realizability
In SIFT the task execution and voting schedules are parameters of the sys-
tem. Provided certain Constraints on the schedule are met, the system is
expected to execute accordingly. This brings about a further concern besides
correctness, namely the realizability of any possible schedule by an implementa-
tion at any level. A parameterized proof of this property seems best, and that
can be formalized by making explicit an input theory Tinput, whose models are
schedules, together with views Ji:Tinput--,Ti at each level of abstraction that
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compose nicely with the views that relate the levels of the hierarchy. As we shall
see the proof of the "realizability property" can be pushed down to the bottom
level specification for which one has to show that any "input models" satisfying
the specifications for the inputs (scheduling and reliability properties) can be
extended to a T n model, where T n denotes the specification of the bottom level.
After showing that the views from Winput compose nicely, it will then follow by
the correctness property of the preceding section that any input model could be
extended to an implementation at any level in the hierarchy. It is my understand-
ing that a full proof of realizability has not been carried out for SIFT to date,
but that plausible informal arguments can be given in support of the realizability
property. The purpose of this Section is to explain what the realizabilit_; pro-
perty means in terms of views, and what remains to be done to have a full proof.
The main observation is that in the SIFT design the function and predicate
symbols F i and Hi in the specification T i of the i-th level can be partitioned into
input and output disjoint subsets, i.e., Fi--Firl,.JFio and IIi___Hifl,.JHio,and that
there is an additional theory Tinput (corresponding to the "schedule axioms" in
Levitt's Investigation, Development, and Evaluation of Performance Proving for
Fault-Tolerant Computers.)10 An explicit account of the partitions at each level
has been given in the section "A Guide to the SIFT Hierarchy." A view Jn:
Tinput---_T, (n the bottom level) is implicitly given in Levitt's report, since the
"schedule axioms" are part of the axioms at the bottom level. The realizability
property means that for each Winput model M there is a T n model M_ such that
Jn,(MI)--M
or in other words, that the view Jn:Tinput---*Tn has the following "realizability
property,"
Definition 6: A view V:T--*T _ has the realizabili_y property if and only if the
function V*: Mod (T t) _Mod(T) is surjective:
Let us assume that the realizability property had already been established
for Jn:Tinput--_Tn and that additional views Ji:Tinput---_Ti,l<i(n-1, are provided
and we show that the following diagram of views commutes
(Ti.p.t)
TI 1 T2 Tn 1 n-1 Tn
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Then the realizability property would follow trivially for each of the
Ji:Tinput-"*Ti, l<i<n-1, and in particular for the view of the top level JI. Also,
each specification level would then be "self contained" in the sense that a model
of the system could be understood at that level by knowledge of only the input
model that it realizes and the specification at that level; knowledge of the other
levels would not be needed.
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APPENDIX C
TUTORIAL BY SRI INTERNATIONAL
TO ILLUMINATE PROOF METHODS
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The foundational material in Appendix B by J. Meseguer defines the basis
for the SIFT proof methodolo_-y. In this appendix we describe the application of
that basis to the proof that was actually performed for SIFT.
The goal of the design proof approach is, of course, to show that an execut-
able implementation at the bottom level of the specification hierarchy satisfies all
the properties asserted in the top level specification. In this way, a system can be
understood in terms of the simpler high level specification without reference to
the details of its low level implementation. The specifications themselves need
not be executable; what is being shown is that any executable bottom level imple-
mentation can be viewed as a high level abstract machine.
As discussed by Meseguer, each view in the SIFT hierarchy represents a
theory of SIFT. Each view includes an image of the schedule table and reliability
input functions and defines SIFT at that level of abstraction. An image of the
schedule table constraints must appear at each level, in terms of the scheduling
abstraction at that level. Mappings between levels map each input and output
function and predicate symbol to symbols from the level below.
Given this, by the correctness and realization results given by Meseguer, one
obtains a specification of a self-contained, parameterized SIFT "machine" at each
level. One is guaranteed that any properties of the top-level machine will follow
for the lowest level machine, as shown by Theorem 3 that the views are "theorem
preserving". One is assured that the behavior described by the I/O Specification
is indeed behavior that will be exhibited by each of the lower level machines.
The consistency result, Corollary 2, shows that if the bottom level of the
specification hierarchy is consistent and views are established and proved between
each adjacent pair of levels, then each one of those specifications is consistent.
Note that the correctness property ensures, in effect, that the mappings from
lower levels have been implemented to form a correct view to the higher level.
If the full proof of correctness and realizability is completed, only curiosity
necessitates scrutiny of lower level views. Consider for example ON.DURING, a
function that was discussed at the peer review. I/O Specification axioms IO.A2
and IO.A5 describe a certain relationship between ON.DURING and RESULT.
In effect, for a task and an iteration, IO.A2 requires that if ON.DURING is true
(and other conditions are satisfied) then RESULT has a certain value (the
"correct" value). Similarly, IO.A5 requires that if ON.DURING is false, and if
any other tasks examines that value, RESULT will be the bottom (null) value.
ON.DURING is thus an input, available for the user to define, that "switches
tasks on and off", a very simple abstraction of a schedule.
It is our contention, based on Meseguer's work, that no understanding of any
lower level specification is necessary to understand this specification. Further,
given the completed proof, any interpretation that can be given to ON.DURING
4O
from this I/O Specification is a valid interpretation in each of the lower level
models too.
The I/O Specification contained no constraints on the user's choice of
ON.DURING. This resulted from our failure at that time to appreciate the Real-
izability result of J. Meseguer, a result that we believe is new and unpublished.
The effect of the omission is equivalent to an undertaking that SIFT is capable of
executing all of its tasks simultaneously. More properly, the schedule constraints
expressed at lower levels should have been mapped into equivalent, more abstract
constraints in the I/O Specification.
Reviewing the proof of SIFT, as it was performed and presented at the peer
review, in the light of the work of J. Meseguer, it is clear that the proof is incom-
plete; the relatively simple demonstrations required for the Realizability property
were omitted. But we are satisfied that the proofs that were done were correct
and appropriate, and represent the greatest part of the complete proof.
Here we provide a guide to the structural components of the actual proof.
The components parallel those discussed by Meseguer. We have not completed
the mappings of the schedule table views at each level, and thus we give only the
lowest level view of the schedule constraints. This work must of course be done
before the proof is said to be complete.
The following pages describe the major function symbols comprising the
input and output function symbols of each view in the hierarchy. We have omit-
ted auxiliary (derived} function symbols and several functions related to schedule
table bounds, task constants, etc. Where we cite actual page numbers for refer-
ence, page numbers refer to the Final Report on the Sift Proof. 10
Several comments on the completeness of the formal method of hierarchical
proof for the actual SIFT proof conclude the guide.
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I/O LEVEL
Axioms: pp. 109-113
Major Axioms: IO.A2, IO.A5
Final Status of IO.A2: page 289
Final Status of IO.A5: page 291
Major Primitive Function and Predicate Symbols
Inputs Mapping From Next Level
Schedule Structure inputs identity
be_ identity
end identity
of identity
real.time identity
Task Function apply identity
function identity
Scheduling ON.DURING RP.D7
Reliability TASK.SAFE RP.DgA
Outputs Mapping From Next Level
Results result RP.D6
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REPLICATION LEVEL
Axioms: pp.125-134
Major Axioms: RP.A3, RP.A2, RP.D4
Mappings: with axioms
Lemmas and Proofs: pp. 137-160
Major Primitive Function and Predicate Symbols
Inputs Mapping From Next Level
Schedule Structure inputs identity
beg identity
end identity
of identity
real.time identity
Task Function apply identity
function identity
Scheduling POLL.FOR.OF BR.RE.MAPPING.4
Reliability SAFE RE.BR.MAPPING.9
Outputs Mapping From Next Level
Results ON BR.RE.MAPPING.5
ON.IN BR.RE.MAPPING.6
IN BR.RE.MAPPING.7,
BR.RE.MAPPING.8
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ACTIVITY LEVEL
Axioms: pp. 171-180
Major Axioms: BR.A41, BR.AgC, BR.A6B, BR.AgA, BR.A35, WITHIN.SKEW
Mappings: pp. 183-185
Lemmas and Proofs: pp. 189-242
Major Primitive Function and Predicate Symbols
Inputs Mapping From Next Level
Schedule Structure INPUTS PP.MAPPING.9
beg identity
end identity
of identity
real.time identity
start identity
finish identity
Task Function function PP.MAPPING.8
Scheduling sched PP.MAPPING.3, PP.MAPPING.4
pollby.for PP.MAPPING. 12
Reliability working.during identity
Outputs Mapping From Next Level
Results inputin .of PP .MAPPING .7
datafilein.for.on PP.MAPPING.5,
PP.MAPPING.6
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PREPOST LEVEL
Axioms: pp. 245-253
Major Axioms: EXECUTE.ACTIVITY, VOTE.ACTIVITY
Mappings: pp. 257-259
Lemmas and Proofs: pp. 263-282
Major Primitive Function and Predicate Symbols
Inputs
Schedule Structure p.inputs
p.config
Task Function task_results
Scheduling sched_table
real_to, virt
Reliability working.during
Outputs
Results input
datafile
One can see from the actual proof transcript that the structure of the
axioms, mappings, and proofs correspond to the foundation for the hierarchical
proof described by Jose Meseguer.
We do point out, however, that only the correctness portion of the hierarchi-
cal proof has been completed. The input theory of schedules and reliability,
given on pages 163-167, has yet to be formally mapped to the hierarchy of views.
Schedule constraints are currently stated in terms of the input function symbols
of the Activity-level specification. It remains to map these constraints up to the
input function symbols of the I/O level.
Two informal extensions to the methodology were needed to handle the real-
ities of the multiprocess program proofs and the issue of the reliability input
function symbols (WORKING, SAFE, etc).
First, to ensure the meaningfulness of the treatment of the reliability func-
tions denoting the schedule of processor failure, it is necessary that these symbols
NOT map to implemented functions in the lowest level of the SIFT system.
That is, a SIFT Executive implementation, could, without additional constraints,
be correct because it is deciding who to believe during voting by taking
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advantage of these functions, presumably provided by underlying hardware{ This
would result in an implementation that is correct but useless in that it must be
run on a machine that could not itself be mechanized. The methodology, as for-
malized, does not take this into account; it is an interesting topic for future
research.
Second, strictly speaking, the lowest level view in the hierarchy is not the
SIFT Executive, but the multi-process system consisting of n communicating
SIFT Executive processes.
The PrePost specification level and the code proof below it address the ques-
tion of a single iteration of the Executive operating on a working Pascal machine,
treated as an ATOMIC, non-interruptible, action. That each iteration of each
instance of the Executive is called by a hardware clock interrupt is completely
beyond the scope of the proof. The significance of this proof to the formalized
notion of correctness given earlier is certainly not immediate.
A supplementary argument is required to reconcile this. A major portion of
this argument was mechanized as part of the verification effort, and constitutes a
large part of the overall SIFT proof. Further metatheoretic argument is required
to formally complete the justification.
Briefly, the idea is the following... Each iteration of the SIFT Executive per-
forms the activities it believes have been scheduled for the current time period
(subframe). Recall that each process is operating asynchronously, attempting by
periodic clock task resynchronization to remain within some maximum skew of
the other clocks. We wish to prove that despite the degree of process asynchrony
present, that:
Whenever an iteration of the Executive on a working processor,
according to its clock, begins to execute a scheduled Execute or Vote
activity, the corresponding input for that activity will have arrived,
and will remain stable throughout the execution of the activity, pro-
vided the input process is executed on a working processor.
In particular, voted input values for a Vote activity and broadcast output values
from an Execute activity must be present and stable during the time the values
can be used.
By establishing this, we can consider activities _o be effectively atomic, and
employ classical input/output sequential verification techniques to establish pro-
perties of the Executive that will be valid even in a multi-process configuration.
This is not a new technique -- the concept is that of Non-Interference, intro-
duced by Owicki and Gries 11 to deal with asynchronous process interaction
where, despite the asynchrony, there is not a high degree of process interaction.
This is deliberately the case in the SIFT design: activity schedules are statically
determined, with scheduling constraints to specifically guarantee that no
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contention for data will occur. Without factoring the multiprocess proof into
separate steps of (1) establishing non-interference, and (2) proving that the
behavior of each effectively atomic activity is correct, we do not believe the proof
could have even begun to reach the level of completion that we have achieved.
A portion of the non-interference justification has been completed. Activity
level lemmas BR.LEMMA.17 and BR.LEMMA.17X prove that, due to scheduling
constraints, an Execute activity on a safe processor will result in other safe pro-
cessors having the result of the Execute, according to local time, at the beginning
of the following subframe. The status of this proof is found on page 293. It fol-
lows from scheduling constraints and an assumption
(BR.LEMMA.FOR.LES.TO.PROVE} that any process with a safe clock task will
be WITHIN SKEW of other clocks. See page 180 for the statement of the
assumptions. BR.LEMMA.FOR.LES.TO.PROVE has not been mechanically
verified; see Lamport and Melliar-Smith 12 for a hand proof. An inductive proof
of BR.LEMMA.4 then establishes that the value present in all safe processors at
the beginning of the subframe following the Execute will be that used for later
voting. Lemmas BR.LEMMA.48 and BR.LEMMA.49 then establish that no other
Execute or Vote activities can interfere with these executed and voted results.
The main Execute axiom of the Activity level, BR.A41, stating that results
of an Execute activity will be in all other working processors according to the
appropriate local time, is actually proven in two different ways: once from the
PrePost and Pascal levels (see page 280), discounting any issue of timing, and
once from BR.LEMMA.17 (see page 293), on the basis of the timing argument.
Following up from these two proofs of the Activity level axiom are two proofs for
IO.A2. Statuses for these are given on pages 297 and 289 respectively.
The applicability of this argument to the actual SIFT system depends on
several additional assumptions. Each iteration of the Executive, the Execute
activity for each application task, and each Vote activity MUST complete in its
allotted time. It is this that J. Moore's proofs of the BDX930 interrupt handling
begin to address. Furthermore, execution of an application task must have no
effect on the state other than to perform a broadcast of its results to other pro-
cessors.
As J. Moore notes in his section of the SIFT Final Report 10 , it is currently
beyond the state of the art to formally prove that machine level interrupt han-
dling will actually ensure the Executive iteration properties on which our proof
ultimately depends. We concur, but do not believe that this in any way detracts
from the significance of what we HAVE proved. It simply suggests areas for
further research.
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